I have maintained over a period of roughly two decades that capital buys power to make policy with a view to its further accumulation, and that it has shown a greatly enhanced return under post-1970s financialised capitalism. Expanding on this formula, I have argued: (a) that the UK is now characterised by a new ‘class/command dynamic’, reflecting a considerable growth in the sway of class over command relations, or class over state; and (b) that the UK is now ruled by a ‘governing oligarchy’ or plutocracy. (a) is probably more controversial than (b), though I struggle to see why. It seems conspicuously clear to me that in the UK (and across many other territories) we inhabit a society divided above all else by social class, and a society characterised by class struggle.
A recent paper by an American sociologist is empirically illuminating and pertinent to this issue as few British papers have been. Timothy Gill contends that sociological theories towards the close of the 20th century gradually shifted away from the notion of a ‘capitalist state’ to the view that capitalist dictates tied the hands of state leaders and lawmakers and to such an extent that the ruling class need not directly govern the state to achieve its will: corporate interests, it seemed, would naturally prevail. References to the capitalist state, once commonplace, have tended to dry up.
On the face of it my class/command dynamic thesis would seem to reflect and ape this shift, though in fact my focus is on structures or relations rather than personnel. But Gill’s US data are revealing. He cites the research of Peter Freitag into whether or not corporate elites ‘populated’ the state. Freitag looked at presidential cabinet appointees from the late 1800s until the Nixon presidency. Gill set himself the task of updating Freitag’s research over the 50 years since Nixon.
Both Freitag and Gill found that a large majority of presidential cabinets have included corporate elites (which both defined as ‘an individual who either possessed a high-ranking managerial position within a corporation (such as a President), a corporate board director, or a corporate lawyer’). Frietag found that 63% of members from 1897-1973 came from the elite corporate sphere, while Gill came up with a slightly reduced proportion, 52%, for the period since.
What Gill also found, however, was that in more recent years the proportion has considerably exceeded the post-1973 average of 52%. For example, the last three administrations have reached levels of 64% (Bush), 52% (Obama), and 72% (Trump), the latter being the highest level over the past half-century. Gill asserts that there is in fact little difference between the Republicans and the Democrats in their corporate appointments over the period he studied.
Positions most dominated by corporate elites, unsurprisingly, included those in Commerce and the Treasury, but also Homeland Security, HUD and the State Department; only Education and Labour have consistently lagged behind at a rate below 30% across several decades. Gill also emphasised that cabinet members are slightly more likely to enter the elite corporate sphere following their tenure in office (illustrating the concept of the ‘revolving door’) at a rate of 72%, with Republicans showing a higher rate than Democrats (75% compared to 66%). In a blog summarising his paper, he writes: ‘a cursory glance at how cabinet members under the Trump administration have operated provides some indication of their importance: Pruitt targeting EPA requirements, Pompeo/Bolton openly praising the business opportunities in a Venezuela without socialist rule, and Steve Mnuchin recently denying that tariffs will affect customers, particularly low-income consumers.’
Does the ruling class rule, Gill asks himself. He replies in the affirmative. He cites Block and Poulantzaz, among many who argued that the structural power of capitalism prevails regardless of who is in office. Would the election of Bernie Sanders to the US presidency change this? He hedges his bets, probably wisely. (As with Sanders, so with Corbyn.)
Structures and individual behaviours have both to be factored in, Gill concludes. What’s my take?
The formula with which I began this blog, plus my reiterated statement of a revised class/command dynamic for financial capitalism, both stand, at least so I contend. My argument, as intimated, is structural or relational. But what of Gill’s US data? What they imply to me is the possibility of a much greater interpenetration of personnel – of C.W.Mills’ ‘interlocking’ power elite – than my thesis requires. Maybe the idea of a bluntly dominant capitalist state in the UK warrants resurrecting. The proof of this particular pudding is, as ever, in its empirical eating. It would be fascinating to discover the extent to which the state apparatus (the political ‘power elite’ in my terminology) actually comprises individuals recruited directly from what I call the capitalist executive. Now there’s a Ph.D in the making! Maybe capital doesn’t just, or even primarily, buy power to fashion policy: maybe it exercises power.
Either which way, here’s a challenge to fellow sociologists: are you really willing to look the other way and (continue to) neglect these issues? I’ve been highlighting via my greedy bastards hypothesis (GBH) – it is the wealthy and rich who, surfing class and command structures to their advantage, are most obviously and causally responsible for working-class sickness and premature death – for over two decades! What has happened to critical and public, let alone foresight and action, sociology? It showed signs of life in the 20th century.